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arXiv 1312.4012cs.DB
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不经意查询处理

Oblivious Query Processing

Arvind Arasu, Raghav Kaushik

摘要:

受云安全问题的影响,人们对可以存储和支持对加密数据的查询的数据库系统越来越感兴趣。这种系统的常见架构是使用可信组件,例如用于查询处理的密码协处理器,其用于安全地解密数据并以明文执行计算。可信组件具有有限的内存,因此大部分(输入和中间)数据在不可信的存储中保持加密,并根据“需求”移动到可信组件。“”在这种设置下,即使使用强加密,来自不可信存储的数据访问模式也有可能泄露敏感信息;实际上,所有使用可信组件对加密数据进行查询处理的现有系统都存在此漏洞。在本文中,我们进行了第一次正式的研究安全查询处理,对手有充分的知识的查询(文本),并观察查询执行学习没有关于底层数据库以外的数据库上的查询的结果大小。我们引入了一个更简单的概念,不经意的查询处理,并正式表明,一个查询承认安全的查询处理,当它承认不经意的查询处理。我们提出了一个丰富的数据库查询,涉及选择,连接,分组和聚合的不经意的查询处理算法。对于我们的算法不处理的查询,我们提供了一些初步的证据,设计不经意(因此安全)的算法将很难通过减少两个简单的,研究充分的问题,通常认为是困难的。我们对不经意查询处理的研究也揭示了与数据库连接理论的有趣联系。

英文摘要:

Motivated by cloud security concerns, there is an increasing interest in database systems that can store and support queries over encrypted data. A common architecture for such systems is to use a trusted component such as a cryptographic co-processor for query processing that is used to securely decrypt data and perform computations in plaintext. The trusted component has limited memory, so most of the (input and intermediate) data is kept encrypted in an untrusted storage and moved to the trusted component on ``demand.'' In this setting, even with strong encryption, the data access pattern from untrusted storage has the potential to reveal sensitive information; indeed, all existing systems that use a trusted component for query processing over encrypted data have this vulnerability. In this paper, we undertake the first formal study of secure query processing, where an adversary having full knowledge of the query (text) and observing the query execution learns nothing about the underlying database other than the result size of the query on the database. We introduce a simpler notion, oblivious query processing, and show formally that a query admits secure query processing iff it admits oblivious query processing. We present oblivious query processing algorithms for a rich class of database queries involving selections, joins, grouping and aggregation. For queries not handled by our algorithms, we provide some initial evidence that designing oblivious (and therefore secure) algorithms would be hard via reductions from two simple, well-studied problems that are generally believed to be hard. Our study of oblivious query processing also reveals interesting connections to database join theory.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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