互补商品的同时拍卖

摘要：

本文研究了互补商品的同时、独立、一价拍卖问题。代理人在出价之前观察每种商品的私人价值，商品之间的互补性明确地纳入其效用。为了简单起见，模型中包含两个一价拍卖和两个竞标者。我们证明了一个单调的纯策略贝叶斯纳什均衡存在的环境。

英文摘要：

This paper studies an environment of simultaneous, separate, first-price auctions for complementary goods. Agents observe private values of each good before making bids, and the complementarity between goods is explicitly incorporated in their utility. For simplicity, a model is presented with two first-price auctions and two bidders. We show that a monotone pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium exists in the environment.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。