TRAIL：RPL中的拓扑认证
TRAIL: Topology Authentication in RPL
摘要：
低功耗和有损网络的IPv6路由协议（RPL）最近被引入作为物联网的新路由标准。尽管RPL定义了基本的安全模式，但它仍然容易受到拓扑攻击，这些攻击会促进黑洞，拦截和资源耗尽。我们关注的是分析相应的威胁，并保护未来的RPL部署免受此类攻击。我们的贡献是双重的。首先，我们分析了最先进的，特别是保护计划VeRA，并提出了两个新的秩序攻击以及扩展，以减轻他们。其次，我们推导和评估TRAIL，一个通用的方案，在RPL的拓扑认证。TRAIL仅依赖于RPL的基本假设，即（1）根结点充当信任锚，以及（2）每个节点作为层次结构的一部分互连到根。使用适当的可达性测试，TRAIL可扩展和可靠地识别任何拓扑攻击者，而无需强大的加密工作。
英文摘要：
The IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) was recently introduced as the new routing standard for the Internet of Things. Although RPL defines basic security modes, it remains vulnerable to topological attacks which facilitate blackholing, interception, and resource exhaustion. We are concerned with analyzing the corresponding threats and protecting future RPL deployments from such attacks. Our contributions are twofold. First, we analyze the state of the art, in particular the protective scheme VeRA and present two new rank order attacks as well as extensions to mitigate them. Second, we derive and evaluate TRAIL, a generic scheme for topology authentication in RPL. TRAIL solely relies on the basic assumptions of RPL that (1) the root node serves as a trust anchor and (2) each node interconnects to the root as part of a hierarchy. Using proper reachability tests, TRAIL scalably and reliably identifies any topological attacker without strong cryptographic efforts.
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