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arXiv 1310.0548cs.GT
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设计每日交易市场

Designing Markets for Daily Deals

Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner

摘要:

Amazon Local、Google Offers、GroupOn和LivingSocial等日常交易平台为商家提供了直接向消费者营销的新渠道。为了最大限度地吸引和留住消费者,这些平台希望提供给用户带来良好价值的交易。目前,选择这样的交易是手动完成的;然而,大量的子市场和地区需要一个自动的方法来选择好的交易和确定商家付款。我们将这一挑战视为市场设计问题。我们假设商家已经很好地了解了他们的交易对消费者的吸引力以及他们愿意支付的金额。我们的目标是设计一个拍卖,最大限度地提高拍卖人(平台)的收入,投标人(商家)的福利,以及对第三方(消费者)的正外部性的组合,尽管关于这个消费者利益的信息不对称。我们设计的拍卖,如实地从商家获得这些信息,并最大限度地提高社会福利的目标,我们的特点是消费者福利的功能,这一目标是真实的实现。我们将这种特性推广到一个非常广泛的机制设计设置,并给出其他应用的例子。

英文摘要:

Daily deals platforms such as Amazon Local, Google Offers, GroupOn, and LivingSocial have provided a new channel for merchants to directly market to consumers. In order to maximize consumer acquisition and retention, these platforms would like to offer deals that give good value to users. Currently, selecting such deals is done manually; however, the large number of submarkets and localities necessitates an automatic approach to selecting good deals and determining merchant payments. We approach this challenge as a market design problem. We postulate that merchants already have a good idea of the attractiveness of their deal to consumers as well as the amount they are willing to pay to offer their deal. The goal is to design an auction that maximizes a combination of the revenue of the auctioneer (platform), welfare of the bidders (merchants), and the positive externality on a third party (the consumer), despite the asymmetry of information about this consumer benefit. We design auctions that truthfully elicit this information from the merchants and maximize the social welfare objective, and we characterize the consumer welfare functions for which this objective is truthfully implementable. We generalize this characterization to a very broad mechanism-design setting and give examples of other applications.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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