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arXiv 1307.3136cs.CRcs.GT
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通过分组定时连接相关网络流的博弈论方法

Linking Correlated Network Flows through Packet Timing: a Game-Theoretic Approach

Juan A. Elices, Fernando Perez-Gonzalez

摘要:

判定两个网络流本质上是相同的是入侵检测或跟踪匿名连接中的一个重要问题。垫脚石或匿名网络可能会试图通过延迟数据包,引入干扰流量,甚至将流分成几个子流来防止流相关。我们引入一个博弈论的框架,这个问题。该框架是用来获得两个不同的对手模型下的纳什均衡:第一个,当对手是有限的延迟数据包,和第二个,当对手还增加了虚拟数据包,并从流中删除数据包。由于最优解码器在计算上是不可行的,我们将可能的解码器限制为估计和补偿攻击的解码器。我们的分析可以用来了解流量相关性的限制下,一个积极的攻击者的数据包定时。

英文摘要:

Deciding that two network flows are essentially the same is an important problem in intrusion detection or in tracing anonymous connections. A stepping stone or an anonymity network may try to prevent flow correlation by delaying the packets, introducing chaff traffic, or even splitting the flow in several subflows. We introduce a game-theoretic framework for this problem. The framework is used to derive the Nash equilibrium under two different adversary models: the first one, when the adversary is limited to delaying packets, and the second, when the adversary also adds dummy packets and removes packets from the flow. As the optimal decoder is not computationally feasible, we restrict the possible decoder to one that estimates and compensates the attack. Our analysis can be used for understanding the limits of flow correlation based on packet timings under an active attacker.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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