应对基于Internet的计算中的不可靠工作者:声誉机制的评估
Coping with Unreliable Workers in Internet-based Computing: An Evaluation of Reputation Mechanisms
摘要:
我们提出了基于信誉的机制,在互联网上建立可靠的任务计算系统。这种系统最典型的例子是志愿者计算和众包平台。在这两个例子中,最终用户通过互联网提供他们的计算能力或他们的人类智慧来解决任务,无论是自愿还是付费。虽然这些系统的主要优点是提供廉价的计算能力,但主要缺点是最终用户的不可信赖性。通常,这种类型的系统是在“主-工人”设置下建模的。一个“master”有一组任务要计算,而不是在本地计算它们,她将这些任务发送给可用的“worker”,后者计算并报告任务结果。我们将这些工人分为三种类型:利他主义,恶意和理性。利他的工人总是返回正确的结果,恶意的工人总是返回错误的结果,理性的工人决定是否如实回答,这取决于什么能增加他们的利益。我们设计了一个强化学习机制来诱导理性工人的正确行为,而该机制是由四个声誉计划,以应付恶意的补充。该机制的目标是达到最终正确性的状态,即,系统的稳态,其中主设备总是获得正确的任务结果。对系统的分析提供了可证明的保证,在这些保证下,可以确保真实的行为。最后,我们通过使用真实系统参数值的模拟来观察该机制的行为。模拟不仅同意的分析,但也揭示了有趣的权衡各种指标和参数。最后,四个信誉计划进行评估对欺骗者的容忍度。
英文摘要:
We present reputation-based mechanisms for building reliable task computing systems over the Internet. The most characteristic examples of such systems are the volunteer computing and the crowdsourcing platforms. In both examples end users are offering over the Internet their computing power or their human intelligence to solve tasks either voluntarily or under payment. While the main advantage of these systems is the inexpensive computational power provided, the main drawback is the untrustworthy nature of the end users. Generally, this type of systems are modeled under the "master-worker" setting. A "master" has a set of tasks to compute and instead of computing them locally she sends these tasks to available "workers" that compute and report back the task results. We categorize these workers in three generic types: altruistic, malicious and rational. Altruistic workers that always return the correct result, malicious workers that always return an incorrect result, and rational workers that decide to reply or not truthfully depending on what increases their benefit. We design a reinforcement learning mechanism to induce a correct behavior to rational workers, while the mechanism is complemented by four reputation schemes that cope with malice. The goal of the mechanism is to reach a state of eventual correctness, that is, a stable state of the system in which the master always obtains the correct task results. Analysis of the system gives provable guarantees under which truthful behavior can be ensured. Finally, we observe the behavior of the mechanism through simulations that use realistic system parameters values. Simulations not only agree with the analysis but also reveal interesting trade-offs between various metrics and parameters. Finally, the four reputation schemes are assessed against the tolerance to cheaters.
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