arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1307.1650cs.DCcs.GT
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共谋下基于Internet的可靠计算机制

Algorithmic Mechanisms for Reliable Internet-based Computing under Collusion

Antonio Fernandez Anta, Chryssis Georgiou, Miguel A. Mosteiro

摘要:

在这项工作中,使用博弈论的方法,成本敏感的机制,导致可靠的基于互联网的计算的设计。特别是,我们认为基于互联网的主-工人计算,其中主处理器分配,在互联网上,一组潜在的不可信的工人处理器的计算任务,并收集他们的响应。工人们为了增加他们的利益可能会串通起来。几个博弈论模型,捕捉问题的性质进行了分析,和算法机制,为每个给定的成本和系统参数,实现高可靠性的设计。此外,两个具体的现实系统的情况下进行了研究。这些场景是一个像SETI这样的志愿者计算系统,以及一家从互联网计算机购买计算周期并以任务计算服务的形式出售给客户的公司。值得注意的是,在某些条件下,非冗余分配产生成本和可靠性之间的最佳权衡。

英文摘要:

In this work, using a game-theoretic approach, cost-sensitive mechanisms that lead to reliable Internet-based computing are designed. In particular, we consider Internet-based master-worker computations, where a master processor assigns, across the Internet, a computational task to a set of potentially untrusted worker processors and collects their responses. Workers may collude in order to increase their benefit. Several game-theoretic models that capture the nature of the problem are analyzed, and algorithmic mechanisms that, for each given set of cost and system parameters, achieve high reliability are designed. Additionally, two specific realistic system scenarios are studied. These scenarios are a system of volunteer computing like SETI, and a company that buys computing cycles from Internet computers and sells them to its customers in the form of a task- computation service. Notably, under certain conditions, non redundant allocation yields the best trade-off between cost and reliability.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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