调暗互联网：检测伊朗作为审查机制的节流
Dimming the Internet: Detecting Throttling as a Mechanism of Censorship in Iran
摘要：
在2009年6月有争议的总统选举之后的几天里，试图接触新闻内容和社交媒体平台的伊朗人遭受了前所未有的通信渠道退化、封锁和干扰。有传言称，政府没有关闭网络，而是将连接速度降低到几乎无法使用的速度，特别是对于多媒体内容的消费和分发。自那以后，其他地方的政治动荡一直与诸如“巴林的高使用率使互联网变慢”和“叙利亚互联网在周五抗议活动中再次变慢”等头条新闻联系在一起，进一步的谣言将缅甸和西藏的政治不稳定与网络连接不良联系在一起。对于受到公众言论威胁的政府来说，限制互联网连接似乎是一种越来越受欢迎的、不易察觉的扼杀信息自由流动的方法。为了评估这种感知的趋势，并开始建立这种做法的问责制和透明度的系统，我们试图概述一个初步的战略，利用一套无处不在的网络测量作为监测服务，然后应用这种方法来阐明在伊朗的审查最近的历史。
英文摘要：
In the days immediately following the contested June 2009 Presidential election, Iranians attempting to reach news content and social media platforms were subject to unprecedented levels of the degradation, blocking and jamming of communications channels. Rather than shut down networks, which would draw attention and controversy, the government was rumored to have slowed connection speeds to rates that would render the Internet nearly unusable, especially for the consumption and distribution of multimedia content. Since, political upheavals elsewhere have been associated with headlines such as "High usage slows down Internet in Bahrain" and "Syrian Internet slows during Friday protests once again," with further rumors linking poor connectivity with political instability in Myanmar and Tibet. For governments threatened by public expression, the throttling of Internet connectivity appears to be an increasingly preferred and less detectable method of stifling the free flow of information. In order to assess this perceived trend and begin to create systems of accountability and transparency on such practices, we attempt to outline an initial strategy for utilizing a ubiquitious set of network measurements as a monitoring service, then apply such methodology to shed light on the recent history of censorship in Iran.
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