揭开在线商业游戏中叛逃者的演变
Unraveling the Evolution of Defectors in Online Business Games
摘要:
匿名的在线商务环境中存在着一种社会困境,即合作还是背叛的困境。买方对卖方和/或卖方对买方的变节可能会使每一方以另一方的损失为代价获得更好的利润。然而,如果这些当事方将来也要互动,不良的过去参照可能会阻止合作行动,从而使彼此失去更好的收益。球员的匿名性和缺乏中央管理机构仍然使这种环境对叛逃者具有诱惑力。在这样的环境中,叛逃者的进化行为可能是什么?如何控制人口增长?这两个问题正是我们在这项研究工作中试图解决的。采用基于遗传算法的空间迭代囚徒困境(SIPD)环境进行了仿真实验。通过实验对系统提供的松动补偿进行了建模和分析。我们的研究结果表明,补偿可以在减少社会中的缺陷人口,但这可能是不够的,一个合作和可靠的社会值得信赖的球员的进化。
英文摘要:
Anonymous online business environments have a social dilemma situation in it. A dilemma on whether to cooperate or Defect. Defection by a buyer to seller and/or seller to buyer might give each a better profit at the cost of the loss of other. However, if these parties were to interact in future too, a bad past reference might prevent cooperative actions, thus depriving each other from a better gain. The anonymity of the players and an absence of central governing body still make this environment tempting for the defectors. What might be the evolutionary behavior of defectors in such environment? How could their increasing population be controlled? It is these two questions basically that we attempt to address in this research work. A genetic algorithm based spatial iterated prisoners dilemma (SIPD) environment has been used to simulate the experiments. A case where compensation for the looser is provided by the system is modeled and analyzed through experiments. Our results show that compensation can be useful in decreasing defective population in the society, however, this might not be enough for the evolution of a cooperative and reliable society of trustworthy players.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。