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arXiv 1304.7330q-fin.GN
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OECD中的政府偿付能力、紧缩与财政巩固:对横向性和非庞氏博弈条件的凯恩斯主义评估

Government Solvency, Austerity and Fiscal Consolidation in the OECD: A Keynesian Appraisal of Transversality and No Ponzi Game Conditions

Karim Azizi, Nicolas Canry, Jean-Bernard Chatelain, Bruno Tinel

摘要:

本文考察了公共债务的非庞氏博弈条件(即公共债务增长率必须低于实际利率,这是李嘉图等价的必要假设)和GDP增长率的横向性条件(即GDP增长率必须低于实际利率)的相关性。首先,在经合组织数据库中可获得的1961年至2010年21个国家的不平衡小组中,这两个条件仅在29%的研究案例中同时得到验证。第二,这两种情况在货币政策更为严格的1980年代和1990年代更为频繁。第三,按照凯恩斯主义的观点,当实际利率高于GDP增长率时,债务/GDP比率上升的情况占75%,而债务/GDP比率下降的情况(财政整顿)仅占43%。

英文摘要:

This paper investigates the relevance of the No-Ponzi game condition for public debt (i.e. the public debt growth rate has to be lower than the real interest rate, a necessary assumption for Ricardian equivalence) and of the transversality condition for the GDP growth rate (i.e. the GDP growth rate has to be lower than the real interest rate). First, on the unbalanced panel of 21 countries from 1961 to 2010 available in OECD database, those two conditions were simultaneously validated only for 29% of the cases under examination. Second, those two conditions were more frequent in the 1980s and the 1990s when monetary policies were more restrictive. Third, in tune with the Keynesian view, when the real interest rate is higher than the GDP growth, it corresponds to 75% of the cases of the increases of the debt/GDP ratio but to only 43% of the cases of the decreases of the debt/GDP ratio (fiscal consolidations).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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