基于Johnson-Nyquist噪声的密钥分发安全性研究
On the security of key distribution based on Johnson-Nyquist noise
摘要：
我们指出，基什的基于噪声的加密协议的安全性的参数依赖于一个非物理的无波限制，如果认真对待，将防止任何相关性的用户之间的发展。我们介绍了一个无噪声版本的协议，也有虚幻的安全性在无波限制，表明噪声和热力学没有发挥重要的作用。然后，我们一般证明，经典的电磁协议不能建立一个秘密的密钥之间的两方分离的时空区域完全监视的窃听者。我们注意到，原始协议的Kish是容易受到被动的时间相关攻击，即使在准静态的限制。最后，我们表明，这种类型的协议可以在实践中对窃听者与嘈杂的监控设备是安全的。在这种情况下，安全性是Maurer和Wolf发现的一个直接后果，即在窃听者的噪声至少部分独立于用户噪声的广泛情况下，可以通过公开讨论从相关随机变量中提取密钥。
英文摘要：
We point out that arguments for the security of Kish's noise-based cryptographic protocol have relied on an unphysical no-wave limit, which if taken seriously would prevent any correlation from developing between the users. We introduce a noiseless version of the protocol, also having illusory security in the no-wave limit, to show that noise and thermodynamics play no essential role. Then we prove generally that classical electromagnetic protocols cannot establish a secret key between two parties separated by a spacetime region perfectly monitored by an eavesdropper. We note that the original protocol of Kish is vulnerable to passive time-correlation attacks even in the quasi-static limit. Finally we show that protocols of this type can be secure in practice against an eavesdropper with noisy monitoring equipment. In this case the security is a straightforward consequence of Maurer and Wolf's discovery that key can be distilled by public discussion from correlated random variables in a wide range of situations where the eavesdropper's noise is at least partly independent from the users' noise.
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