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arXiv 1302.3045cs.GT
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组织网络中生产管理努力分配的博弈分析

Game Theoretic Analysis of Production-Management Effort Distribution in Organizational Networks

Swaprava Nath, Balakrishnan, Narayanaswamy

摘要:

组织是由个人组成的,这些个人通过他们的责任、激励和报告结构联系在一起。这些连接可以用网络来恰当地表示,层次或其他,通常用于划分任务。整个组织的主要目标是最大限度地提高净生产率。这些网络中的个体在他们的生产和管理努力之间进行权衡以执行这些任务,并且权衡受到他们在网络中的位置和奖励份额的影响。这里代理人的努力是可替代的,例如,一个人的生产努力的增加实际上减少了网络中其他一些人的生产努力,这些人现在把他们的努力投入到管理中。代理的管理工作提高了网络中某些其他代理的生产力。在本文中,我们进行了详细的博弈论分析的个人的均衡分裂的努力,多个组件时,连接在一个网络。我们提供了一个设计食谱的奖励分享计划,最大限度地提高净生产性产出。我们的研究结果表明,根据代理人的战略行为,它可能并不总是能够实现最优输出使用的想法,从博弈论称为无政府代价。

英文摘要:

Organizations consist of individuals connected by their responsibilities, incentives, and reporting structure. These connections are aptly represented by a network, hierarchical or other, which is often used to divide tasks. A primary goal of the organization as a whole is to maximize the net productive output. Individuals in these networks trade off between their productive and managing efforts to perform these tasks and the trade-off is influenced by their positions and share of rewards in the network. Efforts of the agents here are substitutable, e.g., the increase in the productive effort by an individual in effect reduces the same of some other individual in the network, who now puts their efforts into management. The management effort of an agent improves the productivity of certain other agents in the network. In this paper, we carry out a detailed game-theoretic analysis of individual's equilibrium split of efforts into multiple components when connected over a network. We provide a design recipe of the reward sharing scheme that maximizes the net productive output. Our results show that under the strategic behavior of the agents, it may not always be possible to achieve the optimal output using an idea from game theory called the price of anarchy.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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