可撤销债务的更新语义
An Update Semantics for Defeasible Obligations
摘要：
道义逻辑DUS是基于Veltman更新语义的规定性义务的道义更新语义。在DUS中，义务的逻辑有效性的定义不是基于静态的真值，而是基于动态的动作转换。本文用更新语义形式化了规定可废止义务，并讨论了可废止道义逻辑的诊断问题。假定一个可撤销的义务“通常A应该（做）”，连同“A没有（做）”这一事实。这是正常性主张的例外，还是违反了义务？在本文中，我们正式的启发式原则，这是一个违反，除非有一个更具体的压倒一切的义务。法律推理的潜在动机是，罪犯应该尽可能少地有机会通过声称他们的行为是例外而不是犯罪来为自己开脱。
英文摘要：
The deontic logic DUS is a Deontic Update Semantics for prescriptive obligations based on the update semantics of Veltman. In DUS the definition of logical validity of obligations is not based on static truth values but on dynamic action transitions. In this paper prescriptive defeasible obligations are formalized in update semantics and the diagnostic problem of defeasible deontic logic is discussed. Assume a defeasible obligation `normally A ought to be (done)' together withthe fact `A is not (done).' Is this an exception of the normality claim, or is it a violation of the obligation? In this paper we formalize the heuristic principle that it is a violation, unless there is a more specific overriding obligation. The underlying motivation from legal reasoning is that criminals should have as little opportunities as possible to excuse themselves by claiming that their behavior was exceptional rather than criminal.
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