交通博弈中的模仿动力学
Imitation dynamics in a game of traffic
摘要：
我们研究了一个交通模型，其中司机采取不同的行为策略。根据驾驶员遵守或不遵守交通规则，这些可能是合作的或有缺陷的。驾驶员可以通过模仿大多数人来改变他们的策略，规则取决于他们与之互动的策略。这些交互发生在交叉口，车辆根据其策略支付时间成本。我们分析的条件下，不同的策略组合代表了系统速度的优势。我们发现，即使在车辆密度较大的情况下，合作者的平均速度也高于背叛者。然而，当叛逃者在一个基本上合作的群体中占少数时，他们可以从平均速度中获益。受过教育的司机，谁坚持坚定的合作行为的核心的存在，优化系统中的速度，特别是对于车辆密度和较高的时间成本的中间值。
英文摘要：
We study a model of traffic where drivers adopt different behavioral strategies. These can be cooperative or defective according to a driver abiding or not by a traffic rule. Drivers can change their strategy by imitating the majority, with a rule that depends on the strategies with which they have interacted. These interactions occur at intersections, where vehicles pay a temporal cost according to their strategy. We analyze the conditions under which different strategy compositions represent an advantage in the system velocity. We found that the cooperators' mean speed is higher than the defectors' even when the vehicle density is large. However, defectors can obtain benefits in their mean speed when they are a minority in an essentially cooperative population. The presence of a core of educated drivers, who persist firmly in a cooperative behavior, optimizes the speed in the system, especially for intermediate values of vehicular density and higher temporal costs.
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