多维覆盖问题的真实机制设计
Truthful Mechanism Design for Multidimensional Covering Problems
摘要:
我们调查{ \em多维覆盖机制设计}问题,其中有$m$项目,需要覆盖和$n$代理谁提供覆盖对象,与每个代理$i$有一个私人的成本,他提供的覆盖对象。目标是选择一组总成本最小的覆盖对象,这些覆盖对象一起覆盖所有项目。我们专注于两个代表性的覆盖问题:无容量限制的设施位置(\ufl)和顶点覆盖(\vcp)。对于多维\ufl,我们给出了一个黑箱方法转换任何{ \em拉格朗日乘子保持} $ρ$ -近似算法\ufl的真实的期望,$ρ$ -近似。机制这产生了多维\ufl的第一个结果,即真实的期望2-近似机制。对于多维\vcp(\mvcp),我们开发了一个{ \em分解方法},减少了机制设计问题到更简单的任务,构建{ \em阈值机制},这是一个受限制的类真实的机制,对于更简单的(在图形结构或问题维度方面)的\mvcp的实例。通过适当地设计分解和阈值机制,它用作构建块,我们获得真实的机制,具有以下近似比($n$是节点的数目):(1)用于$r$的$O(r^2\log n)$-维\vcp ;(2)任意真次闭图族上的$r$维\vcp的$O(r\log n)$(如果节点的两个邻居不属于同一播放器,则改进为$O(\log n)$)。这些是具有非平凡近似保证的\mvcp的第一个真实机制。
英文摘要:
We investigate {\em multidimensional covering mechanism-design} problems, wherein there are $m$ items that need to be covered and $n$ agents who provide covering objects, with each agent $i$ having a private cost for the covering objects he provides. The goal is to select a set of covering objects of minimum total cost that together cover all the items. We focus on two representative covering problems: uncapacitated facility location (\ufl) and vertex cover (\vcp). For multidimensional \ufl, we give a black-box method to transform any {\em Lagrangian-multiplier-preserving} $ρ$-approximation algorithm for \ufl to a truthful-in-expectation, $ρ$-approx. mechanism. This yields the first result for multidimensional \ufl, namely a truthful-in-expectation 2-approximation mechanism. For multidimensional \vcp (\mvcp), we develop a {\em decomposition method} that reduces the mechanism-design problem into the simpler task of constructing {\em threshold mechanisms}, which are a restricted class of truthful mechanisms, for simpler (in terms of graph structure or problem dimension) instances of \mvcp. By suitably designing the decomposition and the threshold mechanisms it uses as building blocks, we obtain truthful mechanisms with the following approximation ratios ($n$ is the number of nodes): (1) $O(r^2\log n)$ for $r$-dimensional \vcp; and (2) $O(r\log n)$ for $r$-dimensional \vcp on any proper minor-closed family of graphs (which improves to $O(\log n)$ if no two neighbors of a node belong to the same player). These are the first truthful mechanisms for \mvcp with non-trivial approximation guarantees.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。