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arXiv 1211.3191cs.CR
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SWEET:利用电子邮件隧道为Web服务

SWEET: Serving the Web by Exploiting Email Tunnels

Amir Houmansadr, Wenxuan Zhou, Matthew Caesar, Nikita Borisov

摘要:

互联网上的开放通信对专制政权的国家构成严重威胁,导致它们在其网络中开发和部署审查机制。不幸的是,现有的审查规避系统不能向其用户提供高可用性保证,因为审查员可以使用当今先进的审查技术来识别属于这些系统的流量,从而破坏这些流量。在本文中,我们提出了SWEET,一个高度可用的抗审查基础设施。SWEET的工作原理是将经过审查的用户流量封装到代理服务器的电子邮件中,这些电子邮件由公共电子邮件服务提供商(如Gmail和Yahoo Mail)传送。由于SWEET的运作不受特定电子邮件提供商的约束,我们认为审查员需要阻止所有电子邮件通信以破坏SWEET,这是不可行的,因为电子邮件构成了当今互联网的重要组成部分。通过我们的系统原型的实验,我们发现,SWEET的性能是足够的Web流量。特别是,普通网站在几秒钟内就可以下载。

英文摘要:

Open communication over the Internet poses a serious threat to countries with repressive regimes, leading them to develop and deploy censorship mechanisms within their networks. Unfortunately, existing censorship circumvention systems do not provide high availability guarantees to their users, as censors can identify, hence disrupt, the traffic belonging to these systems using today's advanced censorship technologies. In this paper we propose SWEET, a highly available censorship-resistant infrastructure. SWEET works by encapsulating a censored user's traffic to a proxy server inside email messages that are carried over by public email service providers, like Gmail and Yahoo Mail. As the operation of SWEET is not bound to specific email providers we argue that a censor will need to block all email communications in order to disrupt SWEET, which is infeasible as email constitutes an important part of today's Internet. Through experiments with a prototype of our system we find that SWEET's performance is sufficient for web traffic. In particular, regular websites are downloaded within couple of seconds.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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