合作竞争广告拍卖
Coopetitive Ad Auctions
摘要：
一则广告往往使多方受益，例如，三星笔记本电脑的广告使微软受益。我们研究这种现象在搜索广告拍卖，并表明，标准的解决方案，包括现状的无知互利和利益意识的维克雷-克拉克-格罗夫斯机制，表现不佳。相比之下，我们表明，一个适当的第一价格拍卖有很好的均衡在一个单一的插槽广告拍卖-所有的均衡，满足自然的合作无嫉妒条件选择福利最大化的广告，并满足直观的收入下限。
英文摘要：
A single advertisement often benefits many parties, for example, an ad for a Samsung laptop benefits Microsoft. We study this phenomenon in search advertising auctions and show that standard solutions, including the status quo ignorance of mutual benefit and a benefit-aware Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, perform poorly. In contrast, we show that an appropriate first-price auction has nice equilibria in a single-slot ad auction --- all equilibria that satisfy a natural cooperative envy-freeness condition select the welfare-maximizing ad and satisfy an intuitive lower-bound on revenue.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
