撤标防假名
False-name-proofness with Bid Withdrawal
摘要：
我们研究了互联网拍卖中更强大的假名操纵变体：代理人可以提交多个假名出价，但是，一旦分配和支付决定，撤回她的一些假名身份（让她的一些假名身份拒绝支付）。虽然这些退出的身份将不会获得他们赢得的物品，但他们最初的存在可能对代理人的其他身份有利。我们定义了一种机制，如果上述操纵永远不会有益，则该机制将是具有撤回的假名证明（FNPW）。FNPW是一个比FNP更强的条件。
英文摘要：
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have been decided, withdraw some of her false-name identities (have some of her false-name identities refuse to pay). While these withdrawn identities will not obtain the items they won, their initial presence may have been beneficial to the agent's other identities. We define a mechanism to be false-name-proof with withdrawal (FNPW) if the aforementioned manipulation is never beneficial. FNPW is a stronger condition than false-name-proofness (FNP).
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
