波普尔、库恩、拉卡托斯与目的导向的经验主义
Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Aim-Oriented Empiricism
摘要：
在本文中，我认为，目的导向的哲学（AOE），我在其他地方进行了一定程度的辩护自然科学的概念，是波普尔，库恩和拉卡托斯的观点的一种综合，但也是对所有三个观点的改进。波普尔的证伪主义保护科学隐含的形而上学假设不受批评，AOE将所有这些假设暴露于持续的批评，并进一步将批评集中在那些如果科学要取得进步就最有可能需要修改的假设上。尽管AOE在这方面比波普尔更倾向于波普尔主义，但在某些方面，它也比证伪主义更像库恩和拉卡托斯的观点。AOE能够，但是，解决问题，库恩和拉卡托斯的意见不能解决。
英文摘要：
In this paper I argue that aim-oriented empiricism (AOE), a conception of natural science that I have defended at some length elsewhere, is a kind of synthesis of the views of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos, but is also an improvement over the views of all three. Whereas Popper's falsificationism protects metaphysical assumptions implicitly made by science from criticism, AOE exposes all such assumptions to sustained criticism, and furthermore focuses criticism on those assumptions most likely to need revision if science is to make progress. Even though AOE is, in this way, more Popperian than Popper, it is also, in some respects, more like the views of Kuhn and Lakatos than falsificationism is. AOE is able, however, to solve problems which Kuhn's and Lakatos's views cannot solve.
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