零决定策略的进化不稳定性表明，胜利并不是一切
Evolutionary instability of Zero Determinant strategies demonstrates that winning isn't everything
摘要：
零决定策略（Zero Determinant，ZD）是一类新的概率策略和条件策略，它能够在囚徒困境的重复博弈中单方面设定对手的期望收益，而不管对手的策略如何，或者设定ZD局中人与对手的期望收益之比。在这里，我们表明，虽然ZD策略是弱优势的，他们不是进化稳定的，而是会演变成较低的强制性策略。我们发现，ZD策略与其他球员的信息优势，使他们能够认识到其他ZD策略可以是进化稳定的（并能够利用其他球员）。然而，这种优势注定是短暂的，因为相反的战略演变，以抵消承认。
英文摘要：
Zero Determinant (ZD) strategies are a new class of probabilistic and conditional strategies that are able to unilaterally set the expected payoff of an opponent in iterated plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma irrespective of the opponent's strategy, or else to set the ratio between a ZD player's and their opponent's expected payoff. Here we show that while ZD strategies are weakly dominant, they are not evolutionarily stable and will instead evolve into less coercive strategies. We show that ZD strategies with an informational advantage over other players that allows them to recognize other ZD strategies can be evolutionarily stable (and able to exploit other players). However, such an advantage is bound to be short-lived as opposing strategies evolve to counteract the recognition.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
