异构DTN中基于少数者博弈的激励机制
Incentive Mechanisms based on Minority Game in Heterogeneous DTNs
摘要:
在本文中,我们设计了一个异构的延迟容忍网络(DTNs)的激励机制。所提出的机制解决了这样的系统的核心问题:如何诱导DTN中继的协调以实现目标性能指标,例如,在网络资源方面的给定约束下,例如,活动节点数或能耗。此外,我们考虑到现实情况下,参与转发过程的成本随设备的技术或用户的习惯而变化。最后,该方案真正适用于DTN,因为它不需要端到端连接。在这种情况下,我们首先介绍利用少数者博弈的概念的基本协调机制。在这个博弈中,中继竞争是在人口少数和他们的效用定义结合奖励机制。奖励进而配置为控制,网络运营商通过该控制来控制DTN的期望操作点。为了这个目的,我们提供了一个完整的表征的异构DTNs的情况下,游戏的均衡。最后,基于随机近似的学习算法可证明地驱动系统的平衡解决方案,而不需要在中继节点或源节点处的完美状态信息,并且不使用端到端通信来实现奖励方案。我们提供了大量的数值结果来验证所提出的计划。
英文摘要:
In this paper we design an incentive mechanism for heterogeneous Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs). The proposed mechanism tackles a core problem of such systems: how to induce coordination of DTN relays in order to achieve a target performance figure, e.g., delivery probability or end-to-end delay, under a given constraint in term of network resources, e.g., number of active nodes or energy consumption. Also, we account for the realistic case when the cost for taking part in the forwarding process varies with the devices' technology or the users' habits. Finally, the scheme is truly applicable to DTNs since it works with no need for end-to-end connectivity. In this context, we first introduce the basic coordination mechanism leveraging the notion of a Minority Game. In this game, relays compete to be in the population minority and their utility is defined in combination with a rewarding mechanism. The rewards in turn configure as a control by which the network operator controls the desired operating point for the DTN. To this aim, we provide a full characterization of the equilibria of the game in the case of heterogeneous DTNs. Finally, a learning algorithm based on stochastic approximations provably drives the system to the equilibrium solution without requiring perfect state information at relay nodes or at the source node and without using end-to-end communications to implement the rewarding scheme. We provide extensive numerical results to validate the proposed scheme.
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