补贴政策对接触网络中疫苗接种决策的影响
The Impacts of Subsidy Policies on Vaccination Decisions in Contact Networks
摘要：
通常，疫苗接种计划是基于自身利益而不是强制性的。由于对疫苗相关风险的认识和“群体免疫”效应，它可能为整个人口提供次优的疫苗接种覆盖率。在这种情况下，政府可能会提供一些补贴政策，以促进疫苗接种覆盖率。但是，并非所有的补贴政策都能有效地控制传染病的传播。我们解决的问题，哪种补贴政策是最好的，以及如何适当地分配有限的补贴，以最大限度地提高疫苗覆盖率。为了回答这些问题，我们建立了一个基于进化博弈论的模型，在这个模型中，个体在考虑自愿接种疫苗机制时试图最大化他们的个人收益。我们的模型表明，单靠自愿接种疫苗不足以控制流行病。因此，系统地研究了两种补贴政策：（1）在免费补贴政策中，补贴的总金额分配给一些人，所有的受赠者都可以免费接种疫苗;（2）在部分抵消补贴政策中，每个接种者都被抵消一定比例的接种成本。模拟结果表明，由于部分抵消补贴政策可以鼓励更多的个人接种疫苗，该政策的绩效明显优于免费补贴政策。
英文摘要：
Often, vaccination programs are carried out based on self-interest rather than being mandatory. Owing to the perceptions about risks associated with vaccines and the `herd immunity' effect, it may provide suboptimal vaccination coverage for the population as a whole. In this case, some subsidy policies may be offered by the government to promote vaccination coverage. But, not all subsidy policies are effective in controlling the transmission of infectious diseases. We address the question of which subsidy policy is best, and how to appropriately distribute the limited subsidies to maximize vaccine coverage. To answer these questions, we establish a model based on evolutionary game theory, where individuals try to maximize their personal payoffs when considering the voluntary vaccination mechanism. Our model shows that voluntary vaccination alone is insufficient to control an epidemic. Hence, two subsidy policies are systematically studied: (1) in the free subsidy policy the total amount of subsidies is distributed to some individuals and all the donees may vaccinate at no cost, and (2) in the part-offset subsidy policy each vaccinated person is offset by a certain proportion of the vaccination cost. Simulations suggest that, since the part-offset subsidy policy can encourage more individuals to be vaccinated, the performance of this policy is significantly better than that of the free subsidy policy.
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