无悔动力学与虚构游戏
No-regret Dynamics and Fictitious Play
摘要：
潜在的无遗憾的动态被证明是与虚构的发挥。粗略地说，这些是ε-最佳回复动态，其中ε是最大的遗憾，随着时间的推移而消失。这使得替代，有时更短的证明已知的结果收敛的无悔动态的纳什均衡。
英文摘要：
Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are epsilon-best reply dynamics where epsilon is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
