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arXiv 1206.6826cs.GT
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鲁棒学习均衡

Robust Learning Equilibrium

Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz

摘要:

我们引入鲁棒学习均衡。学习平衡的思想是多智能体系统中的学习算法本身应该处于平衡状态,而不仅仅是导致平衡。也就是说,学习均衡不受策略偏差的影响:如果所有其他代理都遵循它们的算法,那么每个代理都最好使用其指定的学习算法,而不管环境的未知状态。然而,学习均衡可能不会对非战略性错误免疫。例如,如果在某个时间段内在监视设备中存在故障(例如,正确的输入没有到达代理),则在设备被校正之后遵循算法可能不平衡。一个强大的学习均衡也不受这种非战略性错误的影响。当监控设备“弱”时,(鲁棒)学习均衡的存在尤其具有挑战性。也就是说,每个代理在每个阶段可用的信息是有限的。我们提出了一个具有一般监控结构的鲁棒学习均衡的研究,并将其应用到拍卖的背景下。证明了重复一价拍卖中鲁棒学习均衡的存在性,并讨论了其性质。

英文摘要:

We introduce robust learning equilibrium. The idea of learning equilibrium is that learning algorithms in multi-agent systems should themselves be in equilibrium rather than only lead to equilibrium. That is, learning equilibrium is immune to strategic deviations: Every agent is better off using its prescribed learning algorithm, if all other agents follow their algorithms, regardless of the unknown state of the environment. However, a learning equilibrium may not be immune to non strategic mistakes. For example, if for a certain period of time there is a failure in the monitoring devices (e.g., the correct input does not reach the agents), then it may not be in equilibrium to follow the algorithm after the devices are corrected. A robust learning equilibrium is immune also to such non-strategic mistakes. The existence of (robust) learning equilibrium is especially challenging when the monitoring devices are 'weak'. That is, the information available to each agent at each stage is limited. We initiate a study of robust learning equilibrium with general monitoring structure and apply it to the context of auctions. We prove the existence of robust learning equilibrium in repeated first-price auctions, and discuss its properties.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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