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arXiv 1206.3658cs.AIcs.RO
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艾伦·图灵与认知的“难”与“易”问题:做与感觉

Alan Turing and the "Hard" and "Easy" Problem of Cognition: Doing and Feeling

Université du Québec à Montréal(魁北克大学蒙特利尔分校);University of Southampton(南安普顿大学)

Stevan Harnad

摘要:

认知科学的“简单”问题是解释我们如何以及为什么能做我们能做的事情。“困难”的问题是解释我们如何以及为什么感觉。图灵的认知科学方法论(图灵测试)是基于做:设计一个模型,可以做任何人类可以做的事情,不可避免地从人类,到人类,你已经解释了认知。塞尔已经证明,成功的模型不能仅仅是计算的。感觉运动机器人的能力是必要的,至少,模型的一些话,在机器人可以做什么与世界上的事情,这些话是关于。但即使是接地也不足以保证-也不足以解释如何和为什么-模型感觉(如果它确实如此)。这个问题更难解决(也许是无法解决的)。

英文摘要:

The "easy" problem of cognitive science is explaining how and why we can do what we can do. The "hard" problem is explaining how and why we feel. Turing's methodology for cognitive science (the Turing Test) is based on doing: Design a model that can do anything a human can do, indistinguishably from a human, to a human, and you have explained cognition. Searle has shown that the successful model cannot be solely computational. Sensory-motor robotic capacities are necessary to ground some, at least, of the model's words, in what the robot can do with the things in the world that the words are about. But even grounding is not enough to guarantee that -- nor to explain how and why -- the model feels (if it does). That problem is much harder to solve (and perhaps insoluble).

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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