双城记伦敦和巴黎交通网络的脆弱性
A tale of two cities. Vulnerabilities of the London and Paris transit networks
摘要：
本文对伦敦和巴黎的公交网络在随机故障或攻击下的影响进行了对比研究。特别是，我们分析了如何功能障碍或删除的车站或链接（铁路，道路等）。影响这些网络中的连接属性。我们展示了累积的功能障碍如何导致紧急现象，导致运输系统作为一个整体崩溃。模拟不同的定向攻击策略，我们发现最小的战略具有较高的影响力，并确定与这些网络的弹性相关的先验标准。为了展示我们的方法，我们选择了伦敦和巴黎的公共交通网络。我们的定量分析是在复杂网络理论的框架内进行的-这是一种方法论工具，最近出现了一种跨学科的方法，将随机图，渗流和统计物理理论的方法和概念结合起来。最后，我们证明，考虑到级联效应的网络完整性控制两个网络的不到0.5%的站，即19巴黎和34伦敦。
英文摘要：
This paper analyses the impact of random failure or attack on the public transit networks of London and Paris in a comparative study. In particular we analyze how the dysfunction or removal of sets of stations or links (rails, roads, etc.) affects the connectivity properties within these networks. We show how accumulating dysfunction leads to emergent phenomena that cause the transportation system to break down as a whole. Simulating different directed attack strategies, we find minimal strategies with high impact and identify a-priory criteria that correlate with the resilience of these networks. To demonstrate our approach, we choose the London and Paris public transit networks. Our quantitative analysis is performed in the frames of the complex network theory - a methodological tool that has emerged recently as an interdisciplinary approach joining methods and concepts of the theory of random graphs, percolation, and statistical physics. In conclusion we demonstrate that taking into account cascading effects the network integrity is controlled for both networks by less than 0.5 % of the stations i.e. 19 for Paris and 34 for London.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
