Femtocell市场中的进入和频谱共享方案选择
Entry and Spectrum Sharing Scheme Selection in Femtocell Markets
摘要：
针对家庭基站通信市场，研究了进入者网络服务提供商（NSP）的长期决策：是否进入市场以及选择何种频谱共享技术以实现利润最大化。这种长期决策与进入者的定价策略和用户的总需求密切相关，我们分别将其建模为中期和短期决策。我们考虑两个市场，一个没有现任者，另一个有一个现任者。对于这两个市场，我们证明了用户订阅动态平衡点的存在性和唯一性，并提供了动态收敛的充分条件。对于没有现任者的市场，我们得到的最优价格和市场份额的上限和下限，最大限度地提高进入者的收入，在此基础上，进入者选择一个可用的技术，以最大限度地提高其长期利润。对于只有一个在位者的市场，我们将两个NSP之间的竞争模型化为一个在位者和进入者独立选择市场份额的非合作博弈，并给出了保证至少存在一个纯纳什均衡的充分条件.最后，我们形式化的进入和频谱共享方案选择的问题，并提供数值结果，以补充我们的分析。
英文摘要：
Focusing on a femtocell communications market, we study the entrant network service provider's (NSP's) long-term decision: whether to enter the market and which spectrum sharing technology to select to maximize its profit. This long-term decision is closely related to the entrant's pricing strategy and the users' aggregate demand, which we model as medium-term and short-term decisions, respectively. We consider two markets, one with no incumbent and the other with one incumbent. For both markets, we show the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium point in the user subscription dynamics, and provide a sufficient condition for the convergence of the dynamics. For the market with no incumbent, we derive upper and lower bounds on the optimal price and market share that maximize the entrant's revenue, based on which the entrant selects an available technology to maximize its long-term profit. For the market with one incumbent, we model competition between the two NSPs as a non-cooperative game, in which the incumbent and the entrant choose their market shares independently, and provide a sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of at least one pure Nash equilibrium. Finally, we formalize the problem of entry and spectrum sharing scheme selection for the entrant and provide numerical results to complement our analysis.
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