转换激励零和博弈中的进化轮换
Evolutionary Rotation in Switching Incentive Zero-Sum Games
摘要:
在一个实验室实验中,一轮又一轮的个体互动会导致种群策略状态空间中的社会进化旋转。激励参数的连续切换会导致旋转的方向和强度的连续变化。在扩展的2 × 2博弈的转换支付矩阵实验中(Binmore,Swierzbinski and Proulx,2001 [1]),我们发现社会进化旋转的变化可以定量区分。进化的旋转可以被进化动力学捕获。利用约束复制子动力学模型的雅可比矩阵的特征值,给出了观测到的旋转强度的解释。此外,群体等性秩检验表明,群体的相对反应系数在切换参数博弈中具有持续性。这些数据已相继被用来支持冯·诺依曼的极大极小理论。使用旧的数据,观察到的进化旋转,这份报告提供了一个新的见解进化博弈论和实验社会动力学。
英文摘要:
In a laboratory experiment, round by round, individual interactions should lead to the social evolutionary rotation in population strategy state space. Successive switching the incentive parameter should lead to successive change of the rotation ---- both of its direction and its strength. In data from a switching payoff matrix experiment of extended 2x2 games (Binmore, Swierzbinski and Proulx, 2001 [1]), we find the changing of the social evolutionary rotation can be distinguished quantitatively. The evolutionary rotation can be captured by evolutionary dynamics. With eigenvalue from the Jacobian of a constrained replicator dynamics model, an interpretation for observed rotation strength is given. In addition, equality-of-populations rank test shows that relative response coefficient of a group could persist cross the switching parameter games. The data has successively been used to support Von Neumann's minimax theory. Using the old data, with observed evolutionary rotation, this report provides a new insight into evolutionary game theory and experimental social dynamics.
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