如何在云中为共享优化定价
How to Price Shared Optimizations in the Cloud
摘要:
数据管理即服务系统越来越多地用于协作环境,其中多个用户访问公共数据集。云提供商可以选择实现各种优化,例如索引或物化视图,以加速对这些数据集的查询。每个优化都有成本,并且可能使多个用户受益。这就带来了一个重大挑战:如何选择要执行哪些优化以及如何在用户之间分摊成本。当用户是自私的,并且只会报告他们的真实值时,这个问题尤其具有挑战性,如果这样做可以最大限度地提高他们的效用。在本文中,我们提出了一种新的方法来选择和定价共享优化的机制设计。我们首先展示如何将Shapley值机制应用于选择和定价添加剂优化的简单情况,假设所有用户在同一时间段内访问服务的离线游戏。其次,我们将该方法扩展到用户来来往往的在线场景。最后,我们考虑替代优化的情况。我们分析表明,我们的机制诱导真实性和恢复优化成本。我们还通过实验表明,我们的机制产生更高的效用比国家的最先进的方法的基础上后悔积累。
英文摘要:
Data-management-as-a-service systems are increasingly being used in collaborative settings, where multiple users access common datasets. Cloud providers have the choice to implement various optimizations, such as indexing or materialized views, to accelerate queries over these datasets. Each optimization carries a cost and may benefit multiple users. This creates a major challenge: how to select which optimizations to perform and how to share their cost among users. The problem is especially challenging when users are selfish and will only report their true values for different optimizations if doing so maximizes their utility. In this paper, we present a new approach for selecting and pricing shared optimizations by using Mechanism Design. We first show how to apply the Shapley Value Mechanism to the simple case of selecting and pricing additive optimizations, assuming an offline game where all users access the service for the same time-period. Second, we extend the approach to online scenarios where users come and go. Finally, we consider the case of substitutive optimizations. We show analytically that our mechanisms induce truth- fulness and recover the optimization costs. We also show experimentally that our mechanisms yield higher utility than the state-of-the-art approach based on regret accumulation.
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