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arXiv 1202.4663cs.CR
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两种RFID标签所有权转移协议的保密性研究

On the Privacy of Two Tag Ownership Transfer Protocols for RFIDs

Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh Abyaneh

摘要:

针对标签所有者为攻击者的情况,研究了两种最新的RFID标签所有权转移协议的隐私性。称为ROTIV的第一协议是通过使用具有公钥加密的基于HMAC的认证来提供隐私保护所有权转移的方案。然而,我们对该协议的被动攻击表明,任何合法的所有者,即特定标签的所有者,都能够在过去或将来跟踪它。跟踪标签也可以通过主动攻击任何能够篡改标签并提取其信息的对手。第二个协议称为,陈等人。的协议,是符合EPC Class1 Generation 2标准的无源RFID标签的所有权转移协议。我们对这个协议的攻击表明,特定标签的前所有者能够在未来跟踪它。此外,他们甚至能够在未来的任何时候获得标签的秘密信息,这使得他们能够冒充标签。

英文摘要:

In this paper, the privacy of two recent RFID tag ownership transfer protocols are investigated against the tag owners as adversaries. The first protocol called ROTIV is a scheme which provides a privacy-preserving ownership transfer by using an HMAC-based authentication with public key encryption. However, our passive attack on this protocol shows that any legitimate owner which has been the owner of a specific tag is able to trace it either in the past or in the future. Tracing the tag is also possible via an active attack for any adversary who is able to tamper the tag and extract its information. The second protocol called, Chen et al.'s protocol, is an ownership transfer protocol for passive RFID tags which conforms EPC Class1 Generation2 standard. Our attack on this protocol shows that the previous owners of a particular tag are able to trace it in future. Furthermore, they are able even to obtain the tag's secret information at any time in the future which makes them capable of impersonating the tag.

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