传感器网络中的资源竞争广播
Making Evildoers Pay: Resource-Competitive Broadcast in Sensor Networks
摘要：
考虑由n个正确设备组成的时隙单跳无线传感器网络（WSN），并且t=f*n Byzantine设备，其中f>=0是任何常数;也就是说，Byzantine设备的数量可能超过正确设备。存在希望通过单个信道将消息m递送到正确设备的可信发送者Alice。还有一个恶意用户Carol，他控制了t台拜占庭设备，并使用它们来破坏通信信道。对于常数k>=2，正确设备和拜占庭设备各自拥有O（n^{1/k}）的微薄能量预算，Alice和Carol各自拥有\tilde{O}（n^{1/k}）的有限预算，并且在时隙中发送或监听会产生单位成本。这种通用设置抓住了在资源稀缺和网络攻击的情况下保证通信的固有挑战。考虑到爱丽丝和卡罗尔的这种情况，我们要问：m的交流是否可行？如果可行，代价是什么？我们开发了一种协议，对于任意小的常数ε>0，确保至少（1-ε）n个正确的设备以高概率接收m。此外，如果Carol的设备花费T能量干扰信道，则Alice和正确的设备各自仅花费\tilde{O}（T^{1/（k+1）}）。换句话说，延迟m的传输迫使干扰器快速耗尽其能量供应，从而停止对网络的攻击。
英文摘要：
Consider a time-slotted, single-hop, wireless sensor network (WSN) consisting of n correct devices and and t=f*n Byzantine devices where f>=0 is any constant; that is, the Byzantine devices may outnumber the correct ones. There exists a trusted sender Alice who wishes to deliver a message m over a single channel to the correct devices. There also exists a malicious user Carol who controls the t Byzantine devices and uses them to disrupt the communication channel. For a constant k>=2, the correct and Byzantine devices each possess a meager energy budget of O(n^{1/k}), Alice and Carol each possess a limited budget of \tilde{O}(n^{1/k}), and sending or listening in a slot incurs unit cost. This general setup captures the inherent challenges of guaranteeing communication despite scarce resources and attacks on the network. Given this Alice versus Carol scenario, we ask: Is communication of m feasible and, if so, at what cost? We develop a protocol which, for an arbitrarily small constant ε>0, ensures that at least (1-ε)n correct devices receive m with high probability. Furthermore, if Carol's devices expend T energy jamming the channel, then Alice and the correct devices each spend only \tilde{O}(T^{1/(k+1)}). In other words, delaying the transmission of m forces a jammer to rapidly deplete its energy supply and, consequently, cease attacks on the network.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
