古诺网络代理的联盟信念
Coalitional Beliefs of Cournot Network Agents
摘要：
在网络合作博弈中，由于计算复杂性的问题，代理人不能基于他们的行为的“整个网络的状态”，但必须遵循一定的“信念”，它是如何在他们的战略利益采取行动。这种行为构成了本文的主要兴趣。为此，我们量化和表征的一组信念，支持这种代理人的合作。假设他们从事差异化的古诺竞争，他们平等地分享所产生的价值，我们描述了一组支持核心非空性的联盟信念，从而保证了网络的稳定性。
英文摘要：
In Network cooperative games, due to computational complexity issues, agents are not able to base their behavior on the "whole network status" but have to follow certain "beliefs" as to how it is in their strategic interest to act. This behavior constitutes the main interest of this paper. To this end, we quantify and characterize the set of beliefs that support cooperation of such agents. Assuming that they are engaged in a differentiated Cournot competition and that they equally split the worth produced, we characterize the set of coalitional beliefs that support core non-emptiness and thus guarantee stability of the Network.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
