带友好干扰器的双向不可信中继物理层安全性
Physical Layer Security for Two-Way Untrusted Relaying with Friendly Jammers
摘要：
在本文中，我们考虑了一个双向中继网络中，两个源只能通过一个不可信的中间中继通信，并调查这种双向中继场景的物理层安全问题。具体来说，我们把中间中继作为一个窃听者，从源发送的信息需要保密，尽管事实上，它的合作，在中继这些信息是必不可少的。我们表明，一个非零的保密率确实是可以实现的双向中继网络，即使没有外部友好的干扰。对于有友方干扰的系统，通过进一步的分析可以得出，利用友方干扰机的适当干扰功率可以有效地提高信源的保密率。然后，我们制定了一个Stackelberg博弈模型之间的源和友好的干扰机作为功率控制方案，以实现最优的保密率的源，其中源被视为唯一的买方和友好的干扰机是卖方。此外，给出了干扰功率和要价的最优解，并给出了一个分布式更新算法，以获得该博弈的Stakelberg均衡。最后，仿真结果验证了所提出的基于Stackelberg博弈的方案的性能和效率。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we consider a two-way relay network where two sources can communicate only through an untrusted intermediate relay, and investigate the physical layer security issue of this two-way relay scenario. Specifically, we treat the intermediate relay as an eavesdropper from which the information transmitted by the sources needs to be kept secret, despite the fact that its cooperation in relaying this information is essential. We indicate that a non-zero secrecy rate is indeed achievable in this two-way relay network even without external friendly jammers. As for the system with friendly jammers, after further analysis, we can obtain that the secrecy rate of the sources can be effectively improved by utilizing proper jamming power from the friendly jammers. Then, we formulate a Stackelberg game model between the sources and the friendly jammers as a power control scheme to achieve the optimized secrecy rate of the sources, in which the sources are treated as the sole buyer and the friendly jammers are the sellers. In addition, the optimal solutions of the jamming power and the asking prices are given and a distributed updating algorithm to obtain the Stakelberg equilibrium is provided for the proposed game. Finally, the simulations results verify the properties and the efficiency of the proposed Stackelberg game based scheme.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
