基于博弈论的外包数据高效查询验证
Efficient Query Verification on Outsourced Data: A Game-Theoretic Approach
摘要:
为了节省时间和金钱,企业和个人已经开始将他们的数据和计算外包给云计算服务。然而,这些实体希望确保它们从云服务请求的查询被正确地计算。在本文中,我们使用的经济和竞争的原则,大大降低了外包数据的查询验证的复杂性。我们考虑两种情况:首先,我们考虑存在多个非合谋数据外包服务的情况,然后我们考虑只存在一个外包服务的情况。使用博弈论模型,我们表明,适当的激励结构,我们可以有效地阻止不诚实的行为的一部分,数据外包服务与很少的计算和货币资源。我们证明了一个外包服务作弊的动机可以减少到零。最后,我们表明,一个简单的验证方法可以实现这种减少通过广泛的实验评估。
英文摘要:
To save time and money, businesses and individuals have begun outsourcing their data and computations to cloud computing services. These entities would, however, like to ensure that the queries they request from the cloud services are being computed correctly. In this paper, we use the principles of economics and competition to vastly reduce the complexity of query verification on outsourced data. We consider two cases: First, we consider the scenario where multiple non-colluding data outsourcing services exist, and then we consider the case where only a single outsourcing service exists. Using a game theoretic model, we show that given the proper incentive structure, we can effectively deter dishonest behavior on the part of the data outsourcing services with very few computational and monetary resources. We prove that the incentive for an outsourcing service to cheat can be reduced to zero. Finally, we show that a simple verification method can achieve this reduction through extensive experimental evaluation.
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