发出混合信号--赚得更多，工作更少
Send Mixed Signals -- Earn More, Work Less
摘要：
Emek等人提出了一个概率单物品第二价格拍卖模型，其中拍卖师被告知待售物品的类型，向不知情的投标人广播关于该类型的信号。他们证明了找到最优（为了产生收入）{ \em pure}信令方案是强NP困难的。相比之下，我们证明，找到最佳的{ \em混合}信令方案可以在多项式时间使用线性规划。对于证明，我们表明，这个问题是密切相关的问题，最佳捆绑可分割的商品拍卖。我们还证明了一个混合的信令方案，在某些情况下可以产生两倍的收入最好的纯信令方案，我们证明了一个普遍适用的下限最好的混合信令方案所产生的收入。
英文摘要：
Emek et al. presented a model of probabilistic single-item second price auctions where an auctioneer who is informed about the type of an item for sale, broadcasts a signal about this type to uninformed bidders. They proved that finding the optimal (for the purpose of generating revenue) {\em pure} signaling scheme is strongly NP-hard. In contrast, we prove that finding the optimal {\em mixed} signaling scheme can be done in polynomial time using linear programming. For the proof, we show that the problem is strongly related to a problem of optimally bundling divisible goods for auctioning. We also prove that a mixed signaling scheme can in some cases generate twice as much revenue as the best pure signaling scheme and we prove a generally applicable lower bound on the revenue generated by the best mixed signaling scheme.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
