arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1201.4036q-bio.PEnlin.PSphysics.bio-phphysics.data-an
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克隆选择防止了邻居在石头剪刀布游戏中竞争时的公共悲剧

Clonal selection prevents tragedy of the commons when neighbors compete in a rock-paper-scissors game

Jeppe Juul, Kim Sneppen, Joachim Mathiesen

摘要:

石头剪刀布游戏是许多生态系统中典型的持续循环周转的典型例子,从陆地和水生到微生物。在这里,我们探讨了一个石头剪刀布系统的进化,其中三个物种争夺空间。物种可以变异,改变彼此入侵的速度。在所有物种都有相似的突变率的情况下,我们观察到一个永久的军备竞赛,没有一个物种获胜。当只有两个物种发生突变时,它们的侵略性会无限增加,直到生态系统崩溃,只有非突变物种生存下来。最后,我们表明,当只有一个物种突变,群体选择删除个别捕食者的增长速度最快,导致物种的增长速度稳定。我们定量地解释了这种群体选择。

英文摘要:

The rock-paper-scissors game is a model example of the on-going cyclic turnover typical of many ecosystems, ranging from the terrestrial and aquatic to the microbial. Here we explore the evolution of a rock-paper-scissors system where three species compete for space. The species are allowed to mutate and change the speed by which they invade one another. In the case when all species have similar mutation rates, we observe a perpetual arms race where no single species prevails. When only two species mutate, their aggressions increase indefinitely until the ecosystem collapses and only the non-mutating species survives. Finally we show that when only one species mutates, group selection removes individual predators with the fastest growth rates, causing the growth rate of the species to stabilize. We explain this group selection quantitatively.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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