不需要阴谋：修改的信任游戏中的自组织卡特尔形成
No need for conspiracy: Self-organized cartel formation in a modified trust game
摘要：
我们研究了一个混合人口的信任博弈的动态，其中个人与买家的角色被迫发挥对预定数量的卖家，他们选择动态。代理人的作用，卖方也被允许适应的水平，为金钱的价值，他们的产品，基于回报。动态经历了一个特定的值的战略更新率，以上观察到一个新兴的卡特尔组织，卖方有类似的价值低于最佳性价比的过渡。这种卡特尔组织不是由于代理人之间的明显勾结，而是由于个人收益最大化而自发产生的。这一动态的特点是大幅度波动和大部分参数空间的高度不可预测性，并可作为观察到的某些商品价格水平升高和波动的合理定性解释。
英文摘要：
We investigate the dynamics of a trust game on a mixed population where individuals with the role of buyers are forced to play against a predetermined number of sellers, whom they choose dynamically. Agents with the role of sellers are also allowed to adapt the level of value for money of their products, based on payoff. The dynamics undergoes a transition at a specific value of the strategy update rate, above which an emergent cartel organization is observed, where sellers have similar values of below optimal value for money. This cartel organization is not due to an explicit collusion among agents; instead it arises spontaneously from the maximization of the individual payoffs. This dynamics is marked by large fluctuations and a high degree of unpredictability for most of the parameter space, and serves as a plausible qualitative explanation for observed elevated levels and fluctuations of certain commodity prices.
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