具有文化再生产的生长系统中的合作及其演化
Cooperation and its evolution in growing systems with cultural reproduction
摘要：
我们探讨了合作的演化在进化博弈论的框架下，使用囚徒困境的比喻的问题。我们提出了一个最小模型，考虑到系统和个人的模仿能力的成长过程。我们考虑的拓扑结构和发展的战略解耦，而不是一个共同进化的动态。我们的条件，建立一个真正的拓扑结构的任何自然选择强度的合作系统。当系统开始增长时，合作是不稳定的，但一旦系统达到一个小的合作者核心，当自然选择的强度降低时，合作者的规模就会增加，合作就会变得稳定。因此，我们减少了合作系统的出现与文化的复制，以证明一个小的初始合作结构，我们称之为合作种子。否则，考虑到系统主要作为合作者增长，其合作者居住在系统的最链接的部分，合作进化所需的收益成本比与静态网络相比大大降低。通过这种方式，我们表明，在系统中的个人有模仿能力的成长过程是必不可少的合作的演变。
英文摘要：
We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and individuals with imitation capacity. We consider the topological structure and the evolution of strategies decoupled instead of a coevolutionary dynamic. We show conditions to build up a cooperative system with real topological structures for any natural selection intensity. When the system starts to grow, cooperation is unstable but becomes stable as soon as the system reaches a small core of cooperators whose size increase when the intensity of natural selection decreases. Thus, we reduce the emergence of cooperative systems with cultural reproduction to justify a small initial cooperative structure that we call cooperative seed. Otherwise, given that the system grows principally as cooperator whose cooperators inhabit the most linked parts of the system, the benefit-cost ratio required for cooperation evolve is drastically reduced compared to the found in static networks. In this way, we show that in systems whose individuals have imitation capacity the growing process is essential for the evolution of cooperation.
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