arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1201.0397cs.CR
收藏

在PDF文档中隐藏恶意内容

Hiding Malicious Content in PDF Documents

Dan-Sabin Popescu

摘要:

本文是一个特定数字签名漏洞的概念验证演示,它显示了WYSIWYS(所见即所签)概念的无效性。该算法相当简单:攻击者生成一个多态文件,该文件具有两种不同类型的内容(文本,例如PDF文档,以及图像:TIFF -两种最广泛使用的文件格式)。当受害者签署双重内容文件时,他/她只看到PDF文档,而不知道文件中隐藏的内容。在从受害者那里获得合法签名的文档后,攻击者只需将扩展名更改为其他文件格式。这不会使数字签名无效,因为没有位被更改。由于可移植文档格式(PDF)广泛用于电子政务和电子商务环境,这种攻击的破坏潜力相当大。

英文摘要:

This paper is a proof-of-concept demonstration for a specific digital signatures vulnerability that shows the ineffectiveness of the WYSIWYS (What You See Is What You Sign) concept. The algorithm is fairly simple: the attacker generates a polymorphic file that has two different types of content (text, as a PDF document for example, and image: TIFF - two of the most widely used file formats). When the victim signs the dual content file, he/ she only sees a PDF document and is unaware of the hidden content inside the file. After obtaining the legally signed document from the victim, the attacker simply has to change the extension to the other file format. This will not invalidate the digital signature, as no bits were altered. The destructive potential of the attack is considerable, as the Portable Document Format (PDF) is widely used in e-government and in e-business contexts.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑