具有局部支付的复杂战略网络的拓扑与稳定性代价:分析与模拟研究
Topologies and Price of Stability of Complex Strategic Networks with Localized Payoffs : Analytical and Simulation Studies
摘要:
我们分析了一个网络形成游戏中的战略设置,个人的收益只取决于他们的近邻。我们称这些收益为局部收益。在这个博弈中,每个人的收益包括(1)从近邻获得的收益,(2)桥接收益,以及(3)形成链接的成本。这意味着每个个体的收益可以仅使用其单跳邻域信息来计算。基于这个简单的网络形成模型,我们的研究探讨了网络的结构,形成,满足一个或两个属性,即成对的稳定性和效率。我们分析证明了几个有趣的网络结构,特别是完全二分网络,完全等k-部网络,完全网络和循环网络,在各种配置的模型的两两稳定性。我们通过大量的模拟验证和扩展这些结果。我们利用极值图论的经典结果刻画了有效网络的拓扑结构,并发现Turan图(或完全等二分网络)在许多参数配置下是唯一的有效网络.我们使用稳定性价格的概念来研究成对稳定网络和有效网络的拓扑结构之间的权衡,稳定性价格是最优成对稳定网络中的玩家的收益之和与有效网络的收益之比。有趣的是,我们发现,在所提出的模型中,几乎所有的参数配置的稳定性的价格是等于1;和其余的配置的参数,我们得到了一个下界的稳定性的价格为0.5。这就引出了本文的另一个关键观点:在温和的条件下,当策略个体选择只基于局部收益来添加或删除链接时,有效的网络就会形成。
英文摘要:
We analyze a network formation game in a strategic setting where payoffs of individuals depend only on their immediate neighbourhood. We call these payoffs as localized payoffs. In this game, the payoff of each individual captures (1) the gain from immediate neighbors, (2) the bridging benefits, and (3) the cost to form links. This implies that the payoff of each individual can be computed using only its single-hop neighbourhood information. Based on this simple model of network formation, our study explores the structure of networks that form, satisfying one or both of the properties, namely, pairwise stability and efficiency. We analytically prove the pairwise stability of several interesting network structures, notably, the complete bi-partite network, complete equi-k-partite network, complete network and cycle network, under various configurations of the model. We validate and extend these results through extensive simulations. We characterize topologies of efficient networks by drawing upon classical results from extremal graph theory and discover that the Turan graph (or the complete equi-bi-partite network) is the unique efficient network under many configurations of parameters. We examine the tradeoffs between topologies of pairwise stable networks and efficient networks using the notion of price of stability, which is the ratio of the sum of payoffs of the players in an optimal pairwise stable network to that of an efficient network. Interestingly, we find that price of stability is equal to 1 for almost all configurations of parameters in the proposed model; and for the rest of the configurations of the parameters, we obtain a lower bound of 0.5 on the price of stability. This leads to another key insight of this paper: under mild conditions, efficient networks will form when strategic individuals choose to add or delete links based on only localized payoffs.
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