分层频谱市场的激励机制
Incentive Mechanisms for Hierarchical Spectrum Markets
AI总结：
针对分层多级频谱市场中的效率损失问题，提出一种基于定价的激励机制，通过协调主要运营商（PO）与监管机构的目标，提升社会福利。
摘要：
在本文中，我们研究了分层多级市场中的频谱分配机制，根据当前的频谱政策改革提案，这类市场预计在不久的将来会激增。我们考虑一个场景，其中州政府机构将频谱信道出售给主要运营商（PO），然后PO通过拍卖将其转售给次要运营商（SO）。我们表明，由于不同层实体之间缺乏协调以及PO固有的自私收入最大化策略，这些分层市场无法实现机构所追求的社会有效频谱分配。为了调和这些对立的目标，我们提出了一种激励机制，该机制使PO的策略和行动与机构的目标保持一致，从而在社会福利方面提升系统性能。这种基于定价的方案构成了一种分层市场监管方法。所提出的激励机制的一个基本组成部分是一种新颖的拍卖方案，该方案使PO能够通过平衡其衍生收入和SO的福利来分配其频谱。
英文摘要：
In this paper, we study spectrum allocation mechanisms in hierarchical multi-layer markets which are expected to proliferate in the near future based on the current spectrum policy reform proposals. We consider a setting where a state agency sells spectrum channels to Primary Operators (POs) who subsequently resell them to Secondary Operators (SOs) through auctions. We show that these hierarchical markets do not result in a socially efficient spectrum allocation which is aimed by the agency, due to lack of coordination among the entities in different layers and the inherently selfish revenue-maximizing strategy of POs. In order to reconcile these opposing objectives, we propose an incentive mechanism which aligns the strategy and the actions of the POs with the objective of the agency, and thus leads to system performance improvement in terms of social welfare. This pricing-based scheme constitutes a method for hierarchical market regulation. A basic component of the proposed incentive mechanism is a novel auction scheme which enables POs to allocate their spectrum by balancing their derived revenue and the welfare of the SOs.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
