arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
arXiv 1111.3567cs.ITcs.CRmath.IT

On the Measurement of Privacy as an Attacker's Estimation Error

David Rebollo-Monedero, Javier Parra-Arnau, Claudia Diaz, Jordi Forné

英文摘要:

A wide variety of privacy metrics have been proposed in the literature to evaluate the level of protection offered by privacy enhancing-technologies. Most of these metrics are specific to concrete systems and adversarial models, and are difficult to generalize or translate to other contexts. Furthermore, a better understanding of the relationships between the different privacy metrics is needed to enable more grounded and systematic approach to measuring privacy, as well as to assist systems designers in selecting the most appropriate metric for a given application. In this work we propose a theoretical framework for privacy-preserving systems, endowed with a general definition of privacy in terms of the estimation error incurred by an attacker who aims to disclose the private information that the system is designed to conceal. We show that our framework permits interpreting and comparing a number of well-known metrics under a common perspective. The arguments behind these interpretations are based on fundamental results related to the theories of information, probability and Bayes decision.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑