我知道你在哪里,你在分享什么:利用P2P通信侵犯用户隐私
I Know Where You are and What You are Sharing: Exploiting P2P Communications to Invade Users' Privacy
摘要:
在本文中,我们将展示如何利用实时通信应用程序来确定目标用户的IP地址。我们的研究重点是Skype,虽然其他实时通信应用程序可能有类似的隐私问题。我们首先设计了一个方案,调用一个确定的目标用户不显眼地找到他的IP地址,这可以做到,即使他是后面的NAT。通过定期调用用户,我们可以观察到的用户的移动性。我们展示了如何扩展该计划,以观察成千上万的用户的移动模式。我们还考虑了可链接性威胁,其中已识别的用户与他的互联网使用相关联。我们通过结合Skype和BitTorrent来说明这种威胁,以表明可以确定已识别用户的文件共享使用情况。我们设计了一个基于IP数据报的标识字段的方案,以高精度地验证所识别的用户是否参与特定的洪流。我们的结论是,任何互联网用户都可以利用Skype,并可能其他实时通信系统,以观察数以千万计的已识别用户的移动性和文件共享使用。
英文摘要:
In this paper, we show how to exploit real-time communication applications to determine the IP address of a targeted user. We focus our study on Skype, although other real-time communication applications may have similar privacy issues. We first design a scheme that calls an identified targeted user inconspicuously to find his IP address, which can be done even if he is behind a NAT. By calling the user periodically, we can then observe the mobility of the user. We show how to scale the scheme to observe the mobility patterns of tens of thousands of users. We also consider the linkability threat, in which the identified user is linked to his Internet usage. We illustrate this threat by combining Skype and BitTorrent to show that it is possible to determine the file-sharing usage of identified users. We devise a scheme based on the identification field of the IP datagrams to verify with high accuracy whether the identified user is participating in specific torrents. We conclude that any Internet user can leverage Skype, and potentially other real-time communication systems, to observe the mobility and file-sharing usage of tens of millions of identified users.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。