任意选择函数下单主体序贯决策的子树完备性、逆向归纳和正规-扩展形式等价
Subtree perfectness, backward induction, and normal-extensive form equivalence for single agent sequential decision making under arbitrary choice functions
摘要：
我们重新审视和重新解释Selten的子博弈完美性的概念，在单智能体的正常形式顺序决策的背景下，这导致我们的子树完美性的概念。因此，我们扩展哈蒙德的表征广泛的形式后果主义一致的行为规范的正常形式和任意选择函数在很少的假设。特别是，我们不需要假设任何事件的概率或任何奖励的效用。我们表明，子树的完美性是等价的正常广泛的形式等价，是足够的，但也许令人惊讶的是，不必要的，逆向归纳法的工作。
英文摘要：
We revisit and reinterpret Selten's concept of subgame perfectness in the context of single agent normal form sequential decision making, which leads us to the concept of subtree perfectness. Thereby, we extend Hammond's characterization of extensive form consequentialist consistent behaviour norms to the normal form and to arbitrary choice functions under very few assumptions. In particular, we do not need to assume probabilities on any event or utilities on any reward. We show that subtree perfectness is equivalent to normal-extensive form equivalence, and is sufficient, but, perhaps surprisingly, not necessary, for backward induction to work.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
