论机制设计中黑箱变换的不可能性
On the Impossibility of Black-Box Transformations in Mechanism Design
摘要:
我们考虑的问题转换成一个计算效率高的真实机制的单参数优化问题的任意近似算法。我们要求的减少是黑盒,这意味着他们只需要oracle访问给定的算法,特别是不需要明确的知识的问题约束。例如,当目标是实现贝叶斯真实性并在预期中保持社会福利时,已知这种减少对于社会福利目标是可能的。我们表明,黑箱减少社会福利目标是不可能的,如果所产生的机制是真实的期望,并保持最坏情况下的近似比的算法内的一个次多项式因子。此外,我们证明,对于其他目标,如完工时间,没有黑盒减少是可能的,即使我们只需要贝叶斯的真实性和平均情况下的性能保证。
英文摘要:
We consider the problem of converting an arbitrary approximation algorithm for a single-parameter optimization problem into a computationally efficient truthful mechanism. We ask for reductions that are black-box, meaning that they require only oracle access to the given algorithm and in particular do not require explicit knowledge of the problem constraints. Such a reduction is known to be possible, for example, for the social welfare objective when the goal is to achieve Bayesian truthfulness and preserve social welfare in expectation. We show that a black-box reduction for the social welfare objective is not possible if the resulting mechanism is required to be truthful in expectation and to preserve the worst-case approximation ratio of the algorithm to within a subpolynomial factor. Further, we prove that for other objectives such as makespan, no black-box reduction is possible even if we only require Bayesian truthfulness and an average-case performance guarantee.
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