不同维空间的凸性与多维屏蔽
Convexity and multi-dimensional screening for spaces with different dimensions
摘要:
我们研究了委托代理问题。我们发现,$b$ -凸性的产品,一个条件,出现在最近的一份文件中,由Figalli,金和麦肯\cite{fkm},是必要的制定问题作为一个最大化的凸集。然后,我们表明,当尺寸$m$的类型空间是大于尺寸$n$的产品空间,这个条件意味着额外的维度不编码独立的经济信息。当$m$小于$n$时,我们证明了在产品空间的$b$ -凸性下,委托人只从某个指定的子集提供商品总是最优的.我们表明,这是相当于提供一个$m$维空间的商品。
英文摘要:
We study the principal-agent problem. We show that $b$-convexity of the space of products, a condition which appears in a recent paper by Figalli, Kim and McCann \cite{fkm}, is necessary to formulate the problem as a maximization over a convex set. We then show that when the dimension $m$ of the space of types is larger than the dimension $n$ of the space of products, this condition implies that the extra dimensions do not encode independent economic information. When $m$ is smaller than $n$, we show that under $b$-convexity of the space of products, it is always optimal for the principal to offer goods only from a certain prescribed subset. We show that this is equivalent to offering an $m$-dimensional space of goods.
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