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arXiv 1108.2115cs.AIcs.LO
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首页>外文书>人文>心理励志> The Ditmarsch Tale of Wonders:The Dynamics of Lying

The Ditmarsch Tale of Wonders - The Dynamics of Lying

University of Seville(塞维利亚大学)

Hans van Ditmarsch

摘要:

我们提出了一个动态的说谎逻辑,其中一个“说谎,φ”(其中φ是一个公式的逻辑)是一个动作的意义上的动态模态逻辑,这是解释为一个状态Transformer相对于公式φ。被转换的状态是指向的Kripke模型,编码了代理人对他们信念的不确定性。谎言可以是关于事实命题的,也可以是关于模态公式的,比如其他代理人的信念或其他代理人谎言的信念后果。我们区分(i)一个外部观察者对系统中建模的代理人撒谎,(ii)一个代理人对另一个代理人撒谎,并且两者都在系统中建模。对于这两种情况,我们进一步区分了(iii)相信它被告知的一切(即使以不一致为代价)的代理人,(iv)只相信它被告知的与其当前信念一致的代理人,以及(v)通过不断修改其当前信念来相信它被告知的一切的代理人。逻辑有完整的公理化,这可以通过它们嵌入到所谓的动作模型逻辑或该逻辑的扩展到信念修正中来最优雅地显示。

英文摘要:

We propose a dynamic logic of lying, wherein a 'lie that phi' (where phi is a formula in the logic) is an action in the sense of dynamic modal logic, that is interpreted as a state transformer relative to the formula phi. The states that are being transformed are pointed Kripke models encoding the uncertainty of agents about their beliefs. Lies can be about factual propositions but also about modal formulas, such as the beliefs of other agents or the belief consequences of the lies of other agents. We distinguish (i) an outside observer who is lying to an agent that is modelled in the system, from (ii) one agent who is lying to another agent, and where both are modelled in the system. For either case, we further distinguish (iii) the agent who believes everything that it is told (even at the price of inconsistency), from (iv) the agent who only believes what it is told if that is consistent with its current beliefs, and from (v) the agent who believes everything that it is told by consistently revising its current beliefs. The logics have complete axiomatizations, which can most elegantly be shown by way of their embedding in what is known as action model logic or the extension of that logic to belief revision.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

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