arXivDaily arXiv每日学术速递 周一至周五更新
北美退伍军人节(Veterans Day),12 日无更新
arXiv 1107.4452cs.NI
收藏

分布式调度问题的对策论方法

A Game Theoretic Approach to Distributed Opportunistic Scheduling

Albert Banchs, Andres Garcia-Saavedra, Pablo Serrano, Joerg Widmer

摘要:

由于没有一个知道所有信道状态的中心实体,分布式机会调度(DOS)本质上比传统的机会调度更难。在DOS下,站点使用随机接入来竞争信道;在成功竞争之后,它们测量信道条件并且仅在良好信道的情况下进行传输,而当信道条件差时放弃传输机会。DOS系统的分布式特性使得它们容易受到自私用户的攻击:通过偏离协议并使用更多的传输机会,自私用户可以以牺牲行为良好的用户为代价获得更大的无线资源份额。在本文中,我们从博弈论的角度来解决DOS中的自私问题。我们提出了一种算法,满足以下性质:(i)当所有的站实现算法,无线网络被驱动到最佳点的操作,和(ii)一个或多个自私的站不能获得任何利润偏离算法。该算法的关键思想是通过使用(间接)惩罚该站的更积极的配置来对自私站做出反应。我们建立在多变量控制理论,设计一种机制,惩罚,一方面是足够严重,以防止自私的行为,而另一方面是轻到足以保证,在没有自私的行为,系统是稳定的,并收敛到最佳点的操作。我们进行了重复游戏的基础上的博弈论分析,以显示该算法对自私站的有效性。这些结果得到了广泛的模拟证实。

英文摘要:

Distributed Opportunistic Scheduling (DOS) is inherently harder than conventional opportunistic scheduling due to the absence of a central entity that has knowledge of all the channel states. With DOS, stations contend for the channel using random access; after a successful contention, they measure the channel conditions and only transmit in case of a good channel, while giving up the transmission opportunity when the channel conditions are poor. The distributed nature of DOS systems makes them vulnerable to selfish users: by deviating from the protocol and using more transmission opportunities, a selfish user can gain a greater share of the wireless resources at the expense of the well-behaved users. In this paper, we address the selfishness problem in DOS from a game theoretic standpoint. We propose an algorithm that satisfies the following properties: (i) when all stations implement the algorithm, the wireless network is driven to the optimal point of operation, and (ii) one or more selfish stations cannot gain any profit by deviating from the algorithm. The key idea of the algorithm is to react to a selfish station by using a more aggressive configuration that (indirectly) punishes this station. We build on multivariable control theory to design a mechanism for punishment that on the one hand is sufficiently severe to prevent selfish behavior while on the other hand is light enough to guarantee that, in the absence of selfish behavior, the system is stable and converges to the optimum point of operation. We conduct a game theoretic analysis based on repeated games to show the algorithm's effectiveness against selfish stations. These results are confirmed by extensive simulations.

机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来,可能存在错误,请以论文正文为准。

↑