在Selective-DoS攻击下保护Tor隧道
Securing Tor Tunnels under the Selective-DoS Attack
摘要：
匿名通信系统容易受到选择性拒绝服务（DoS）攻击。选择性拒绝服务攻击降低了匿名性，因为它们迫使路径多次重建以确保交付，这增加了更多攻击的机会。在本文中，我们提出了一种检测算法，过滤出受损的通信渠道，最广泛使用的匿名网络之一，Tor。我们的检测算法使用两个层次的探测过滤出潜在的受损隧道。我们进行概率分析和广泛的模拟，以显示我们的检测算法的鲁棒性。我们还分析了我们的检测算法的开销，并表明，我们可以实现令人满意的安全保证合理的通信开销（在最坏的情况下，总可用Tor带宽的5%）。真实世界的实验表明，我们的检测算法提供了很好的防御选择性拒绝服务攻击。
英文摘要：
Anonymous communication systems are subject to selective denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Selective DoS attacks lower anonymity as they force paths to be rebuilt multiple times to ensure delivery which increases the opportunity for more attack. In this paper we present a detection algorithm that filters out compromised communication channels for one of the most widely used anonymity networks, Tor. Our detection algorithm uses two levels of probing to filter out potentially compromised tunnels. We perform probabilistic analysis and extensive simulation to show the robustness of our detection algorithm. We also analyze the overhead of our detection algorithm and show that we can achieve satisfactory security guarantee for reasonable communication overhead (5% of the total available Tor bandwidth in the worst case). Real world experiments reveal that our detection algorithm provides good defense against selective DoS attack.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
