无非周期性的偏好聚合理论：没有多数人不满的核心
Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction
摘要：
个人偏好的非周期性是社会选择理论的一个最小假设。我们用偏好在固定议程上具有最大要素的直接假设来取代这一假设。我们表明，一个简单的游戏的核心是非空的所有配置文件，这样的偏好，当且仅当在议程中的替代品的数量小于中村数的游戏。如果我们用没有多数人不满的核心来取代核心，也是如此，通过从议程中删除对获胜联盟中所有参与者来说都不是最大的所有替代方案来获得核心。与核心不同，没有多数不满的核心只依赖于参与者的极大元素集，并包含在这些集合的并集中。扩展框架的结果给出了另一种意义，即没有多数人不满的核心比核心表现得更好。
英文摘要：
Acyclicity of individual preferences is a minimal assumption in social choice theory. We replace that assumption by the direct assumption that preferences have maximal elements on a fixed agenda. We show that the core of a simple game is nonempty for all profiles of such preferences if and only if the number of alternatives in the agenda is less than the Nakamura number of the game. The same is true if we replace the core by the core without majority dissatisfaction, obtained by deleting from the agenda all the alternatives that are non-maximal for all players in a winning coalition. Unlike the core, the core without majority dissatisfaction depends only on the players' sets of maximal elements and is included in the union of such sets. A result for an extended framework gives another sense in which the core without majority dissatisfaction behaves better than the core.
机构、总结、中文摘要均由AI分析而来，可能存在错误，请以论文正文为准。
